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THE CASE FOR TAX LOOPHOLES 
By Murray L. Weidenbaum, Director 
Center for the Study of American Business 
Washington University9 St. Louis 
A Paper Prepared for A Conference on 11 A New Tax Structure for the United States, 11 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, March 16, 1977 
Presenting the case in favor of tax loopholes may seem to be an example 
of trying to defend the indefensible. 11 Loophole 11 of course is a perjorative 
term, indicating some special advantage that a person or group has achieved, 
presumably at the expense of the public welfare. And, as we are told repeat-
edly, eliminating all of the loopholes would permit a massive reduction in 
tax rates without any overall decline in revenues. 
The implicit trade-off sounds so desirable that we may wonder why the 
change has not been made before. The obvious answer of course quickly comes 
to mind : it is the special interests that have prevented it. Although that 
rationale may possess some explanatory value, another approach will be pre -
sented here, an approach based on a broader view of public policy. We will 
examine the role of these special tax provisions in the light of the tota l ity 
of governmental tax, expenditure, and regulatory activities, especially as 
these activities affect the relationship of public to private functions in 
the United States. But before doing so, we will cover some preliminary 
material. At this point, it will be helpful to examine the nature of the 
loophole arrangements and their impacts on the tax system of which they have 
become so basic a part. 
Note: The author is indebted to Robert DeFina for the calculations of tax 
expenditures by income class and for other helpful assistance . 
Numerous useful comments on an earlier draft were made by Linda 
Rockwood. 
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Technically, the term loophole -- at least in my understanding -- applies 
to that entire broad and disparate range of specific provisions in the tax 
code which permit one or more taxpayers to depart from the general structure 
used for taxing income. To clear the air at the outset, I am not about to 
defend every 11 raid 11 on the Treasury. That is, I will not be supporting the 
desirability of each and every special provision of the Internal Revenue Code 
(these remarks will be concentrating on the federal income tax system, al-
though many of the specific points can apply to state and local tax structures). 
As a general proposition, I favor the economic notion of 11 horizontal equity" 
--that is, equal treatment of taxpayers in similar circumstances. And it 
should be recognized that a "cleaner" tax code -- one with fewer special pro-
' 
visions -- likely would help to achieve a greater degree of horizontal equity . 
Yet, it needs to be acknowledged that there is room for a good degree of 
legitimate quibbling as to who are the equals to be treated equally. The 
taxpayer who devotes a portion of his or her income to voluntary contributions 
to eelemosynary institutions may quite properly be viewed a bit differently 
than the taxpayer with identical income who devotes all of that income to his 
or her personal gratifications. This would seem to be one of the many in-
stances in life where sensible results are more likely to be achieved by 
carefully balancing a variety of important considerations, rather than single-
mindedly attempting to pursue just one. 
At this point, a brief examination of the composition of tax loopholes 
may be in order (I will of course try to avoid the obvious distinction that 
those special tax provisions which benefit me are essential to the public 
welfare, but those that you use are just low-priority loopholes). As Professor 
Boris Bittker explained on this campus on an earlier occasion, there are very 
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few tax provisions which meet the formal dictionary definition of "an ambiguity 
or omission in a statute, etc., which affords opportunity for evading its in-
tention.".!! In the main, tax loopholes are not the product of an ingenious 
attorney or accountant laboriously examining tt1e minutia of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Rather, the typical "loophole 11 was deliberately placed there by 
the Congress to achieve a public purpose, a purpose of which you or I may 
speak good or ill. Even as enthusiastic a critic of these special tax provi-
sions as Professor Stanley Surrey has been moved to note than many of them 
"were expressly adopted to induce actions which the Congress considered in the 
nat i on a 1 i n teres t . "?J 
To belabor the obvious, the charitable deduction was not inserted in the 
tax system to provide windfall gains to the wealthy but, in Professor Surrey's 
words, "to foster phi 1 anthropy. 11 As we are about to see, however, the pro-
viders of that philanthropy constitute a varied lot. 
The Nature and Com~osition of Tax Expenditures 
As it turns out, there is a classification of special tax provisions 
which is available for our use. In recent years, the term "tax expenditures 11 
has been developed to describe the cost to the government of what on earlier 
occasions had been labeled as loopholes. The formal definition is more de -
scriptive albeit somewhat formidable: "revenue losses attributable to provi-
sions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special ~xclusion, exemption, or 
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential 
rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability." 
~efore turning to the data, however, a critique of the tax expenditure 
concept is in order. On its surface, that dreadful phrase may seem to be an 
- 4 -
anomaly. Either something is a tax or it is an expenditureo According to 
Professor Surrey, who is generally acknowledged to be the father of the tax 
expenditure concept, "The term 'tax expenditure' has been used to describe 
those special provisions of the federal tax system which represent government 
expenditures made through that system to achieve various social and economic 
objectives.'''}_/ The notion that the tax incentive device involves the expendi-
ture of government funds is a fundamental error, however, and one that leads 
to all sorts of erroneous public policy proposals. 
The Surrey view is based on the implicit assumption that the state is en-
titled to as much individual inGome as it desires. Hence, the citi.zen's claim 
. . . 
on his or her own income is secondary or residual. Thus, any reduction in 
. 
that flow of private income to the public Treasury is viewed as an act of 
grace by a benevolent sovereign. To the contrary , a tax expenditure -- if 
the concept is to have any justificat-ion -- signifies less taking of private 
funds by government. This is a simple but powerful point. In my view, tax 
expenditures should be seen in the context of the substantial taxes which are 
being paid by private individuals and corporations. To tell a person who is 
paying out over a third of his or her income in federal taxes that he or she 
is unduly benefitting from some tax expenditure reflects a strange view of 
tax equity. And to be told that by a beneficiary of the low income allowance 
compounds the insult. 
Tax incentives are a device designed to alter private behavior in an 
' . 
economy already strongly influenced by government; they are intended specifi-
cally to increase private expenG!iture on a particular item or catego~y. From 
a purely fiscal viewpoint, a dollar less paid in taxes has the same effect 
on the budget position as a dol·l a r more d.i;sburs;ed by government. But-, a 
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variety of different consequences may flow from choosing the tax or the ex-
penditure route for achieving public purposes. 
An important shortcoming of the tax expenditure concept arises from the 
method used in estimating the dollar magnitudes. The data reported do not 
take account of any of the indirect effects from the operation of each of 
these special tax provisions.~ Many of the tax expenditures alter taxpayer 
behavior and economic conditions; their elimination also might require off-
setting changes in federal expenditure programs or in other aspects of the 
tax system in order to avoid obviously undesirable effects -- but thus prevent 
the Treasury from recapturing the full revenue loss. The tax exemption of 
interest received on state and local bonds is an interesting case in point • 
. On the surface, this provision appears merely to provide tax relief to the 
holders of these securities. And numerous tax reformers urge the prompt 
elimination of that "loophole" on that basis. But, on reflection, the tax 
exemption enables the states and localities to issue bonds at lower interest 
rates than other borrowers of comparable risk categories. (Certainly, the 
purchasers of these securities would turn to higher yield issues if the in-
terest were to become taxable.) 
Thus, some of the tax expenditure also implicitly involves a substantial 
subsidy to the governmental units issuing these securities. In fact, the 
more sophisticated tax reform proposals designed to eliminate or reduce the 
use of the tax-exempt securities i nvo 1 ve the payment of federa 1 subsidies .to 
state and local governments to offset the higher interest payments that they 
would have to make in order to sell their securities in the "taxable market." 
. 
. . . 
Depending on the subsidy level, there could be a net l.oss or a net gain to 
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the Treasury from the combination of closing the tax-exemption loophole and 
simultaneously enabling state and local governments to continue selling bonds 
at low interest costs.~ 
Despite these and other shortcomings, the available data on so-called 
tax ~xpenditures are useful in making some rough approximations of the distri-
bution of the beneficiaries of tax ••loopholes. 11 The results may well come as 
a surprise to many of the enthusiastic but less critical supporters of the 
concept. But, then again, one is reminded of the hoary governmental wise-
crack, 11 If you want it bad, you get it bad. 11 
Some of the 11 tax expenditures 11 are well known and have become notorious. 
A few ready examples are depletion allowances, the tax exemption of the in-
• 
terest on state and local bonds, and those provisions which have been used to 
shelter certain types of income (such as expensing of interest and taxes paid 
during the construction of buildings). However, it may come as a surprise to 
many that these items comprise a relatively small portion of the $95.3 bil-
lion of tax expenditures reported by the Treasury Department in the fiscal 
year 1976.§1 The great bulk of the $95.3 billion, rather, consists of items 
which I suspect the vast majority of the public never thinks of as a loophole. 
Among the largest tax expenditures, for example, are the deductibility 
of mortgage interest and property taxes on owner-occupied residences. The 
tax treatment of these two items of personal expenses of the typical home-
owner account for a total of $8.9 billion of revenue foregone in the fiscal 
year 1976. Other significant special provisions include deducting charitable 
contributions ($5.4 billion of revenue loss to the Treasury), excluding from 
. 
taxation employer and self-employed contributions to employee pensions ($8.4 
billion) and medical insurance premiums and medical care programs for 
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employees ($4.5 billion), excluding from taxation social security and unemploy-
ment benefits ($7.0 billion), and deducting personal state and local taxes, 
other than on homes ($8.0 billion) . 
However, merely reciting specific examples such as these may give a dis-
torted picture of the total reality. Tables 1 and 2, therefore, are an 
attempt to show the overall distribution of tax expenditures by income class. 
The data on tax expenditures are taken from the official tabulation in the 
annual federal budget. The assignment of tax expenditure benefit to income 
classes is based on a Treasury Department study for 1971 prepared for the 
Joint Economic Committee.ZI 
The amounts shown in the category "lower income groups 11 are based on the 
• 
proportion of each tax expenditure in 1971 received by those taxpayers with ad-
justed gross income of $10,000 or less. The data for the 11 middle income groups .. 
are based on the proportion of each tax expenditure in the base year going to 
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of $10,000 to $50,000. Frankly, I would 
have preferred using a lower top limit for the middle grouping but the Treasury 
did not split up the category, $20,000 to $50,000. Nevertheless, the bulk of 
the tax expenditures (56 percent in 1971) were received by the bottom half of 
the middle group, those reporting adjusted gross incomes of $10,000 to $20,000. 
The "upper income groups 11 in these tables consist of taxpayers with adjusted 
gross incomes of $50,000 and over. 
. 
No attempt is made here to trace through the incidence of the tax ex-
penditures received by corporations, although I would expect that some sub-
stantial portion of the ultimate benefit is received by lower-income and 
middle-income groups. The public finance literature provides a variety of 
viewpoints. Personally, I subscribe to a mixed case, where some of the bene-
fits are shifted forward to consumers in the form of lower prices, some are 
- 8 -
shifted backward to employees in the form of higher incomes and fringe bene-
fits , and some significant amount benefits the shareholders . Examples of 
probab l e backward shifting, although relatively small, may be the most ap-
parent. I have in mind here the tax credit for employing welfare recipients 
and the increase in the investment credit for the companies that use t he 
proceeds to finance employee stock ownership plans . 
As shown in Table 1, the bulk of all the estimated tax expenditures are 
received by lower and middle income taxpayers -- $56.5 billion out of $95.3 
billion in 1976 or 59 percent of the total. By and large the major recipients 
of the tax expenditure benefits received by personal (as contrasted to 
corporate) taxpayers are those i n the middle-class category-- $38 .6 billion 
compared to $17.9 billion for the lower-income category and $15.9 billion for 
the upper-income category. 
Several large tax expenditures benefit primari ly lower-income taxpayers. 
This i s the case with the tax exemption of various government benefit pay-
ments which are received primarily by low income people who would otherwise 
have to pay taxes on such income. Examples i nclude excluding veterans dis-
ability compensation payments ($595 million of revenue foregone), excluding 
social security benefits ($2.7 billion), and excluding unemployment benefits 
($3.3 billion). 
To be sure, several important types of tax expenditures tend to benefit 
primarily corporations and investors and other relatively high -bracket income 
earners. Examples in this category include the special tax treatment of 
capital ga ins ($7.9 billion), the investment credit ($9.5 billion), t he ex-
. 
elusi on of interest on state and local debt ($4. 8 billion), and the excess 
of percentage over cost depletion (·$1.3 billion). Clearly, the $95.3 billion 
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Table 1 
SUMMARY OF TAX EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEAR 1976 
(dollars i n bil lions) 
Amount Percent of Total 
Estimated benefits to lower 
income groups 
Estimated benefits to middle 
income groups 
Estimated benefits to upper 
• 1ncome groups 
Estimated benefits to 
corporations 
Total 
Source: Table 2. 
$17.9 
38.6 
15.9 
22.9 
95.3 
19 
40 
17 
24 
100 
• 
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of tax expenditures in the fiscal year 1976 cannot be characterized as merely 
an array of depletion allowances and other very specialized or esoteric tax 
• • prov1s1ons. 
Table 2 (presented at the end of this paper) shows the great variety of 
the specific tax expenditures for which the Treasury Department publishes 
estimated dollar magnitudes . 
Justifications for Tax Incentives 
The basic justifications that have been put forward for the various 
special tax provisions are extensive and have varied over time, even for in-
dividual items. Typical national objectives cited by the proponents have 
ranged from fostering emp l .. oyment and economic growth to enhancing equity to 
supporting worthy private institutions and state and local governments. The 
specific weight given to any of these objectives is, of course, a rather 
subjective matter. 
The special treatment of the major tax expenditures received by upper-
income taxpayers and corporations -- capital gains, the investment credit, 
and similar items -- is justified by the need to promote investment and hence 
achieve a growing economy which will provide both more employment and a rising 
standard of living. We need to recall also that the special tax treatment of 
capital gains was instituted prior to the insertion of the income-averaging 
concept into the Internal Revenue Code. In that earlier period, were capital 
gains to have been taxed at ordinary income rates, many taxpayers would have 
.. been paying taxes on long-term gains far higher than the brackets that would 
correspond to their income levels during the period in which those gains were 
. 
• 
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accruing (that is the 11 bunching 11 phenomenon ). I assume, however, that income 
averaging would be extended to capital gains should these gains become tax-
able at regular rates. Thus, the primary justification for differential 
capital gains treatment can now be viewed in different terms -- providing de-
sired inducements to investment. We should be aware of the obvious: to the 
extent that the private sector is unable to raise the funds to finance 
economic growth, pressure rises for greater governmental involvement in busi-
ness affairs . 
Surely, in recent years, the federal government has become an important 
competitor for investment funds. The Treasury•s financing of budget deficits 
plus a growing array of federally-owned or federally-sponsored credit agencies 
' have obtained one-third or more of the total funds flowing through the nation's 
capital markets.~ Viewed from this prospective, the various tax expenditures 
devoted to encouraging private investment may merely offset the deleterious 
effects of the government's expenditure and borrowing activities. 
The deductibility of state and local taxes furthers the objective of 
strengthening the other levels of government through the federal government•s 
sharing the burden of the taxes levied by these jurisdictions. This can be 
viewed as an early "revenue sharing 11 effort in the federal system. Moreover, 
in the absence of this deduction or a provis·ion with similar effect, the 
combination of federal, state, and local income taxes for some taxpayers could 
. 
result in a total rate close to 100 percent of income, thus bordering on sheer 
confiscation. When the top bracket of the federal income tax was 93 percent, 
this was a very real possibility. 
Numerous reasons are cited for the tax deductibility of charitable con-
tributions. The voluntary, private institutions thus supported provide 
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diversity and free choice. They can experiment and enter fields too contro-
versial for government agencies. They often take on responsibilities which 
otherwise would be financed entirely by tax revenues.~ 
The deductibility of interest paid by individuals (that is, interest on 
personal as opposed to business indebtedness) is a more complicated matter. 
The largest portion is interest on mortgages on owner-occupied homes. The 
deterioration of many central cities in recent years has strengthened the 
justification of enhancing family and neighborhood stability by encouraging 
individual home ownership. The deductibility of interest on general consumer 
debt may be more difficult to defend. Personally, I find it hard to see why 
the general taxpayer should subsidize the families that wish to go into debt 
to buy new refrigerators or second cars. In contrast, the interest that in-
dividuals receive on their savings is of course fully taxable. Perhaps, un-
intentionally, this provision also illustrates the tendency of the tax system 
to tilt in favor of consumption rather than saving. 
Some personal deductions are really reasonable refinements of gross in-
come in order to obtain a fair and equitable concept of a taxable income base. 
Cases in point are the deductions of expenses related to earning income, such 
as union dues, child care for working wives, work clothing, and fees on safe 
deposit boxes for securities. A few corporate tax exemptions -- notably the 
exemption of credit unions and some of the income of cooperatives -- are an 
aid to those non-profit institutions organized in the corporate form. 
As in each of the other cases cited here, no attempt is made at this 
point in the argument to assess the adequacy of these justifications, but 
. 
merely to emphasize that there is another side to the traditional tax reform 
arguments . Although most popular discussions of tax reform tend to ignore 
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the substantive purposes of many of these special tax provisions, the underly-
. ing literature of public finance does not. In the most definitive study of 
personal tax deductions, for example, Professor C. Harry Kahn states that 
these tax provisions are designed to "differentiate between taxpayers whose 
incomes, though apparently equal, are of different sizes in some relevant 
sense." 101 
Thus, without prejudging their effectiveness, we should note that at 
least some special tax provisions (perhaps the additional exemption for the 
blind or the deduction of casualty losses) are intended to further the achieve-
ment of horizontal equity (equal treatment of equals). Professor Kahn goes 
on to state that "care must be taken not to designate the tax equivalents [the 
revenue foregone from pers6nal d~ductions] as simple tax losses . If intend-
ed to spur private expenditures , for instance, in the philanthropic domain, 
the figures represent more accurately the tax post to the government of en-
couraging expenditures which might otherwise have to be undertaken by govern-
ment."ll/ 
. 
Shortcomings of the T~x lhcehtive Approach 
. 
Surely the Internal Revenue Code contains numerous "marginal" subsidies, 
where a modest tax benefit enables the private sector to continue some worthy 
· undertaking (hospitals or orphanages, for example) at a fraction of the cost 
which the federal Treasury would have to bear should the activity be run by 
the state. · But, there are tax "she·lters 11 in the CoEie · which provide an in-
ordinate amount of benefit to the recipients or cost to the Treasury, far out 
of proportion to their value to society as a whole. 
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Special tax provisions (tax expenditures) have been criticized on numerous 
grounds. Many of them, especially the deductions from income, are attacked as 
being regressive, because they reduce the tax burdens of upper income tax-
payers more than those of lower income taxpayers. Deductions clearly do have 
that effect. Under the deduction approach, the amount of tax saving per dol-
lar of deductible expenditure depends on the marginal tax bracket of the tax-
payer. Thus, an upper income taxpayer receives a larger tax reduction than 
does a lower income taxpayer for making the same dollar amount of charitable 
contribution or payment of state and local taxes . 
In effect, the government subsidizes the taxpayer to the extent of 14 
percent of the state and local taxes and charitable contributions for the 
individual or family in th~ lowest tax bracket (when they itemize rather than 
take the standard deduction). In the case of those in the top bracket, the 
government subsidizes 70 percent of those expenditures, and somewhere in be-
tween for the others. The many taxpayers using the standard deductions re-
ceive no tax benefits from their contr.i buti ens. 121 
From the viewpoint of achieving desired public policy objectives, special 
tax provisions lack some of the compelling characteristics of direct expendi-
tures. The typical (but not all) direct expenditure programs offer the 
following advantages: the public has a clearer picture of the flow of federal 
assistance; the Congress can exercise annual control over the size and dis-
tribution of the benefits; the financial aid given to private individuals and 
groups can be weighed against the desirability of government agencies taking 
direct responsibility for the programs in question. This idyllic view, how-
ever, ·is not readily reconciliable with the reality of trends in the federal 
- 15 -
budget. In recent years, the relatively 11 Uncontrollable 11 expenditure programs 
(social security pensions, interest on the public debt, unemployment compensa-
tion, etc.) have come to dominate total federal spending. In fact, many of 
these programs do not even appear in the annual appropriation bills but are 
funded via so-called permanent and indefinite appropriations. 131 
Prospects for Change 
As pointed out earlier in this paper, this is not a plea for the reten-
tion of every special provision in the tax system. To an economist, it is 
reasonable to contrast the costs and benefits of various mechanisms for 
achieving public policy objectives. It certainly is conceivable that, in 
some cases, direct expenditures may be a more desirable alternative than tax 
' 
incentives. In other cases, credit assistance or regulatory programs or still 
other approaches may be preferred. There seems to be little need to take a 
. 
doctrinaire attitude and prohibit public policy from using any one of these 
. 
alternatives. Rather, the advantages and disadvantages of each mechanism 
should be weighed and the most desirable one used to achieve a specific ob-
jective, be it the encouragement of business investment or the discouragement 
of environmental pollution. 
On reflection, the implications of moving from indirect support through 
the tax system to direct federal expenditure subsidies are profound, especial-
ly in the many instances of aid to private and state-local institutions. 
Taken literally (as has been suggested by some tax reformers), this move would 
mean putting private hospitals, orphanages, schools, and similar social 
service and charitable institutions into the federal budget. 141 The opportuni-
. ties for federal influence and control over the conduct of these private 
• 
' 
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organizations would be obvious and could be very considerable. 
Moreover, the constitutional separation of church and state would prob-
ably prevent extending such direct general-purpose financial support to church-
related medical and educational facilities and certainly to the religious 
institutions themselves. The choice between tax incentives and direct federal 
expenditures turns out to involve more than the selection among technical 
financing mechanisms. The choice involves altering the balance between public 
and private power in our society. Although the issue is rarely if ever so 
clearly joined, that may explain why the debate gets so heated at times. 
However, the use of the tax incentive route does not require adhering 
to the specific types of tax mechanisms now in use. For example, the deduc-
tion from taxable income is not the only way in which the tax system can be 
used to encourage taxpayers to spend some of their money in a manner which 
accords with national interests. It is merely an example of the power of the 
status quo. Deductions have been part of the system since the institution 
of the income tax law in 1913. 
An alternative to the deduction is already available and has been used 
in various specific instances -- the tax credit, which is a deduction from 
the ultimate tax liability rather than from taxable income. Although the 
distinction between credits and deductions may be considered to be a techni-
cal matter only of interest to specialists, the differences in effects may 
. 
be very significant for the individual taxpayer. Given the progressive na-
ture of the personal income tax structure, ordinary deductions are implicitly 
regressive . Credits can be more flexible. A credit can be given in terms 
. 
of a percentage of an expenditure, and various ceilings may be put on the 
amount of the credit. Moreover, credits can be used by that vast portion of 
- 17 ~ 
low and moderate income taxpayers that do not itemize individual contributions, 
but use the standard deduction. 
The credit concept is in widespread use in the corporate tax structure, 
where its use ranges from encouraging the employment of welfare recipients 
to expanding business plant and equipment. In the individual tax system, 
credits are now provided for child and dependent care expenses, retirement in-
come, and political contributions (sometimes as a voluntary alternative to 
the deductions). Suggestions to use tax credits in place of personal exemptions 
(the present $750 deduction for each taxpayer and dependent) have been made by 
President Carter and Vice President Mondale, among others. 
As pointed out earlier, the value of a deductible dollar varies with the 
. 
taxpayer's bracket. With a fixed percentage credit, in contrast, a given 
. 
dollar of charitable outlays, for example, wouid generate the same amount of 
tax saving, regardless of the taxpayer's income level. Of course, the upper 
bracket taxpayers might make a larger donation and thus qualify for a larger 
absolute tax benefit, but they would receive the same proportional benefit. 
Depending on the percentage credit, such a system would reenforce the pro-
gressivity of the personal income tax, since those whose marginal rates were 
below the percentage credit would have their average bill reduced. Those in 
the higher brackets would find their tax bills raised in the process . 
The mechanism of a tax credit could be important in strengthening the 
. 
role of voluntary organizations in our national life by making them more 
democratic. Because the proposed tax credit would operate to the advantage 
of lower and moderate income taxpayers, it could help to create a potential 
. 
new constituency for private institutions, freeing many of them from their 
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present dependence on the wealthy few. Unlike the alternative of direct sup-
port through government expenditures, substituting tax credits for personal 
deductions would constitute a modest step toward decentralizing decision-
making in our society and encouraging diversity in the way that social objec-
tives are achieved. 
One would wish to cite a less shopworn metaphor, but the typical tax re-
former tends to concentrate on the hole rather than on the doughnut. Unfor-
tunately, the existing situation seems to be a fine example of the Lord (or 
the Feds, rather) giveth and the Feds taketh away. Private institutions in 
the United States of course were alive, well, and growing prior to their sup-
port through the income tax system. No doubt the powerful combination of 
. 
heavy taxation and the expansion of public philanthropy and functions has 
adversely affected both the ability and the incentive of private citizens to 
support private undertakings and has led to the need for offsetting aid via 
the tax incentive route. 
As has been amply demonstrated in another connection, a major long-term 
barrier to private sector saving and investment is the large governmental 
budget deficits whose financing is competitive with private undertakings. If 
the public sector were smaller and its intrusion into the private sector sub-
stantially reduced, there might be little need to advocate supporting private 
institutions via the tax system. To be sure, some private interests -- be 
. 
they business, labor, agriculture, or any other --will always try to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the public welfare. But that knowledge should 
not cause us to overlook the fundamentally adverse impacts of government ac-
tion on the private sector. 
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Perhaps we have come full circle. The aims of the conventional tax re-
formers and the objectives of the apparent defenders of the status quo may 
not be as far apart as they initially appear to be. The reconciliation of 
the two sets of objectives may lie in the more widespread understanding of 
the conditions that led to the adoption of so many of the special tax provi-
sions in the first place. The simple elimination of these tax provisions 
often would leave unfulfilled the objectives that they are designed to foster. 
Yet a more effective approach to public policy might be in dealing with the 
basic conditions that often prevent private institutions, business and non-
profit alike, from performing their intended functions, conditions that 
frequently -- and on occasion unwittingly -- result from the rapid expansion 
of governmental activities. Dealing with those basic conditions would have 
the added advantage of avoiding the revenue losses and the equity problems 
that may result from using tax incentives. 
One example, among many, may help to particularize this general notion. 
As many studies have demonstrated, the compulsory minimum wage law tends to 
price low-skilled and low-educated workers, especially teenagers, out of the 
labor market. To some extent, this adverse effect is offset by tax credits 
which are intended to encourage employers to give jobs to this target popula-
tion. I am confident that employment would rise, the budget deficit reduced, 
and the general welfare enhanced if both programs were eliminated simultaneous-
. 
ly. But to eliminate the tax expenditure while ignoring the underlying 
problem, as seems to be the traditional approach to tax reform, is another 
exercise in futility. 
Similarly, the need for tax incentives to encourage private support of 
educational institutions arises in so large a part from the adverse effects 
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of other governmental actions. The rapid expansion of classrooms and educa-
tional buildings in public institutions has frequently resulted in much of 
the higher educational system operating far below capacity, and thus pushing 
up unit costs (more generous scholarships directly paid to students would 
have been a far more efficient approach). These upward cost pressures are in 
addition to the basic inflation engendered by federal fiscal and monetary 
policy. 
A similar situation arises in the health field. The overly rapid expan-
sion of hospitals has resulted in an empty bed problem with attendant upward 
pressures on unit costs. And here the inflation in health care costs result-
ing from the government's medicare and medicaid programs has exacerbated the 
financial squeeze facing private health care institutions. 
It is cavalier, to say the least, for the naive tax reformers to blithely 
ignore all of the adverse impacts of government action on private institutions 
and then pick on one of the few areas of public policy -- tax expenditures --
where the public sector attempts to undo the damage. 
Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to show that a sympathetic examination of .. loop-
holes" or tax expenditures, to use the more technical and quantifiable term, 
can be useful. The mechanism of tax expenditures (or incentives) may serve 
a variety of public purposes, ranging from promoting. business investment and 
economic growth to encouraging private, voluntary organizations. 
Indeed, the growth of tax expenditures may be viewed as a reaction to 
the severe impacts that the expansion of government power and activities has 
had on the viability of private sector institutions. But the prompt elimina-
tion of those obstacles (such as large deficit financing and pervasive 
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government regulation) seems to be an unrealistic expectation. Hence, the 
reliance on second-best alternatives, such as tax expenditures, may on occa-
sian be a sensible route. 
The survey of the specific tax expenditures which is undertaken in this 
paper reveals that, in the main, they are not special benefits to the highest 
income classes nor the product of ingenious accountants or attorneys. Rather, 
the typical tax expenditure benefits primarily middle and lower income groups 
of the population. Nor are the major tax expenditures obtained by engaging 
in unusual activities. Rather, they are received from such prosaic activities 
as paying ·state and local taxes, owning a home, and working for a company that 
provides group insurance and similar fringe benefits . 
. 
To be sure, not all tax expenditures are of this nature -- and not each 
one ·needs to be defended. But the point being made here is that neither 
should the entire category be condemned and its elimination urged as an un-
equivocal matter of equity. 
As pointed out in this paper, there are reforms which could be instituted 
-- such as the more widespread use of the tax credit device -- to simultaneous-
ly help to achieve greater progressivity in the tax structure and still serve 
to attain the basic purposes intended by the Congress. 
Given the current interest in tax reform, it seems evident that proposed 
changes should be viewed in a broader context than in the past. Questions of 
. income distribution and macroeconomic policy have tended to dominate the dis-
cussion of tax policy. But we must also address such other important aspects 
as the effects on the respective roles of the public and private sectors and 
of federal, state, and local governments and the resultant shifts in the 
distribution of power in the society. 
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All in all, tax incentives may, in this imperfect world, often be the 
most realistic available alternative to achieving such important objectives 
as enhancing economic growth and employment, strengthening state and local 
governments, and encouraging a diversity of private, voluntary approaches to 
meeting society's needs. 
- 23 -
Table 2 
ESTIMATED TAX EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEAR 1976 
(in millions of dollars ) 
Item of Tax Expenditure 
,.. . I I I • I 
Benefit Primarily to Lower Income Group 
Exclusion of benefits and allowances to 
armed forces personnel 
Disability insurance benefits 
Exclusion of social security benefits 
Additional exemption for the blind 
Exclusion of sick pay 
• 
Exclusion of unemployment benefits 
Exclusion of public assistance benefits 
Deduction and credit for child and 
dependent care expenses 
Exclusion of scholarships and fellow-
ships 
Exclusion of veterans disability 
compensation 
Excess of percent standard deduction . 
·over 1 ow income a 11 owance 
Earned income credit 
Subtotal 
Benefit Primarily to Middle Income Group 
' . . 
Exclusion of military disability pensions 
. 
Exclusion of veterans pensions 
Exclusion of G.I. Bill benefits 
Lower 
Income 
765 
277 
2,153 
14 
101 
1,968 
95 
241 
144 
309 
855 
165 
7,087 
22 
7 
73 
Benefit To Income 
· Middle Upper 
Income Income 
245 
46 
49 1 
6 
90 
1,334 
--
49 
51 
280 
274 
53 
2, 919 
48 
16 
162 
10 
7 
81 
--
4 
33 
--
--
--
6 
11 
2 
154 
20 
7 
70 
Group 
· Corpo-
rati ons 
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
Total 
1,020 
330 
2,725 
20 
195 
3,335 
95 
290 
195 
595 
1, 140 
220 
10,160 
90 
30 
305 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Item of Tax Expenditure 
¥ • I j I • i 
Additional exemption for over 65 
Retirement income credit and credit 
for the elderly 
Exclusion of capital gain on home if 
over 65 
Exclusion of railroad retirement system 
benefits 
Benefits for dependents and survivors 
Exclusion of special benefits for dis-
abled coal miners 
Exclusion of income earned abroad by 
U.S. citizens 
Expensing of certain capital outlays by 
farmers 
Capital gains treatment of certain in-
come of farmers 
' 
Dividend exclusion 
Deduction of interest on consumer credit 
Deduction of mortgage interest on 
residenc::es 
Deduction of property taxes on 
residences 
Depreciation on rental housing in excess 
of straight lin~ 
Housing rehabilitation 
Exclusion of .workers' compensation benefits 
Exclusion of pension contributions and 
• earn1ngs 
Lower 
Income 
275 
26 
10 
46 
155 
12 
32 
159 
110 
90 
316 
779 
564 
49 
3 
283 
1,980 
Be_!1efi t . To Income Group. · · · 
Middle Upper Corpo-
Income Income rations Total 
607 
58 
21 
101 
342 
27 
110 
241 
167 
288 
1, 684 
3,799 
2, 902 
194 
15 
295 
5, 383 
26 3 
26 
9 
43 
148 
11 
3 
55 
38 
52 
105 
292 
564 
162 
7 
12 
987 
--
--
--
--
-... 
--
-- . 
85 
10 
--
--
--
--
100 
15 
--
--
1,145 
110 
40 
190 
645 
50 
145 
540 
325 
430 
2,105 
4, 870 
4, 030 
505 
40 
590 
8, 350 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Item of Tax Expenditure 
4 • I f • 
Exclusion of employer-paid premiums 
on accident and life insurance 
Exclusion of employer-paid medical 
insurance premiums and medical care 
Exclusion of employer provided meals 
and lodging 
Exclusion of income of trusts to finance 
supplementary unemployment benefits 
Exclusion of interest on life insurance 
• sav1ngs 
Deduction of charitable contributions 
Deduction of medical expenses 
Deduction of casualty losses 
Parental personal exemptions for 
students, age 19 and over 
Deduction of non-business state and 
1 oca 1 taxes 
Credit and deduction for political con-
tributions 
Deferral of capital gain on home sale 
Credit for purchase of new home 
Deferral of interest on savings bonds 
Excess first year depreciation 
Maximum tax on earned income 
Subtotal 
Benefit Primarily to Upper Income Group 
Capital gains 
Capital gains treatment of royalties on 
coal and iron ore 
Subtotal 
Benefit To Income Gr9up 
Lower Middle Upper Corpo-
Income Income Income rations Total 
217 
1,212 
133 
4 
215 
531 
764 
84 
209 
556 
3,008 
164 
6 
1,225 
2,496 
1,389 
167 
418 
823 4,584 
8 19 
135 659 
104 507 
132 292 
29 94 
145 321 
9,736 32,365 
439 
2 
441 
1,830 
10 
1,840 
57 
270 
13 
--
215 
1,843 
162 
59 
93 
2,558 
8 
51 
39 
126 
17 
139 
8,524 
5,051 
28 
5,079 
--
--
--
--
--
540 
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
40 
--
790 
545 
15 
560 
830 
4,490 
310 
10 
1,655 
5,410 
2,315 
310 
720 
7,965 
35 
845 
650 
550 
180 
605 
51,415 
7,865 
55 
7,920 
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Table 2 (continued) 
I tern of Tax ,Exeendi tur_e 
Benefit Prima.rily .to Corppratio,ns, 
Investment credit 
Credit for employing AFDC and public 
assistance recipients 
' 
Depreciation on buildings (other than 
housing) in excess of straight line 
Employee stock ownership plans financed 
through investment credit 
Exemption of credit unions 
Exclusion of certain income of · 
cooperatives 
Corporate surtax exemption 
Capital gains treatment of certain 
timber income 
Expensing of exploration and development 
costs 
Excess of percentage over cost depletion 
Exclusion of interest on state and local 
debt 
Expensing of research and development 
Expensing of construction period interest 
and taxes 
Exclusion of gross-up on dividends of 
LDC corporations 
Deferral of income of Domestic Inter-
national Sales Corporations 
. 
Special tax rate for western hemisphere 
trade corporations 
Lower 
Income 
507 
--
24 
--
--
-33 
--
11 
14 
23 
17 
5 
52 
--
--
--
Benefit To Income 
Middle Upper 
Income Income 
923 
--
96 
--
--
-104 
--
28 
59 
105 
263 
17 
114 
--
--
--
380 
--
80 
--
--
-18 
--
56 
87 
157 
1,365 
3 
49 
--
--
--
Group 
Corpo-
rations 
7,685 
10 
225 
25 
145 
410 
4,170 
290 
640 
1,010 
3,115 
1,325 
415 
40 
1,220 
50 
Total 
9,495 
10 
425 
25 
145 
255 
4,170 
385 
800 
1,295 
4,760 
1,350 
630 
40 
1,220 
50 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Item of Tax Expenditure 
0 
Deferral of tax on shipping companies 
Railroad rolling stock five year 
amortization 
Excess bad debt reserve of financial 
institutions 
Credit for corporations in U.S . 
• possess1ons 
Lower 
Income 
--
--
--
--
Benef it To Income 
Middle Upper 
Income Income 
-- --
-- --
-- --
-- --
Group 
Corpo-
rations 
110 
-25 
485 
240 . 
Total 
110 
-25 
485 
240 
Subtotal 620 1,501 2,159 21,585 25,865 
Total 17,884 38,625 15,916 22,935 95,360 
Source: Data in total column and for corporations taken from Special Analyses, 
Budget of the Unit~d States Government, Fiscal Year 1978. For explana-
tion of breakdown by income class see appendix to this paper . 
. -
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